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ABSTRACT  
  Commentators have argued that, even if the president has the 
unilateral authority to terminate Article II treaties concluded with the 
Senate’s advice and consent, the president lacks the unilateral authority 
to terminate “congressional-executive agreements” concluded with 
majority congressional approval, such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This Article challenges that claim. If one 
accepts a presidential authority to terminate Article II treaties, this 
Article contends, there is no persuasive reason to conclude differently 
with respect to congressional-executive agreements. Congressional-
executive agreements have become largely interchangeable with Article 
II treaties as a matter of domestic law and practice. For example, either 
instrument can be used to address matters relating to international 
commerce and trade. Moreover, while presidents cannot unilaterally 
terminate statutes, congressional-executive agreements are not mere 
statutes. They are, like Article II treaties, binding international 
instruments that can be concluded by the United States only through 
presidential action. These agreements also typically contain withdrawal 
clauses similar to those contained in Article II treaties, which presidents 
have long invoked unilaterally, and Congress has never indicated that 
presidents have less withdrawal authority for such agreements. Indeed, 
in its trade legislation, Congress appears to have accepted that 
presidents may invoke such clauses unilaterally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency brought renewed 
attention to the scope of the president’s authority to terminate the 
United States’ international agreements. During his campaign, Trump 
suggested that he might terminate various agreements, and after taking 
office he announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the 
Paris agreement on climate change.1 He has also threatened to 
terminate various trade agreements, including NAFTA.2 
The text of the Constitution does not specifically address this 
question of presidential authority. Article II states that, in order to 
make a treaty, the president must obtain the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate,3 but it does not specify how such Article II treaties 
are to be unmade. Moreover, it says nothing at all about either the 
making or unmaking of “executive agreements,” even though such 
agreements now constitute the vast majority of the United States’ 
 
 1. See Lisa Friedman, U.S. to Join Climate Talks Despite Planned Withdrawal from Paris 
Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/climate/us-to-join-
climate-talks-despite-planned-withdrawal-from-paris-accord.html [https://perma.cc/7KW2-CY 
UQ]; Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html 
[https://perma.cc/96HQ-N65K]. 
 2. See Ana Swanson, Trump’s Tough Talk on Nafta Raises Prospects of Pact’s Demise, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/economy/nafta-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/U9FK-CDUW]. 
 3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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international agreements.4 
In part because of longstanding historical practice, many 
commentators have concluded that the president can act unilaterally 
for the United States in terminating Article II treaties, at least when 
international law permits termination.5 Some commentators who 
accept this proposition nevertheless contend that the president lacks 
unilateral authority to terminate congressional-executive 
agreements—that is, international agreements concluded by presidents 
with majority congressional authorization or approval, like NAFTA.6 
This Article challenges that claim. If one accepts presidential authority 
to terminate Article II treaties, this Article contends, there is no 
persuasive reason to conclude differently with respect to 
congressional-executive agreements. 
Part I explains why presidential authority to terminate Article II 
treaties is generally accepted, and it briefly describes the phenomenon 
of executive agreements. Part II contests the claim that congressional-
executive agreements differ from Article II treaties with respect to 
presidential termination authority. Part III discusses other potential 
constraints on presidential withdrawal from treaties and congressional-
executive agreements. Part IV concludes. 
I.  PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE ARTICLE II 
TREATIES 
The U.S. Constitution describes how the United States can make 
treaties, but it does not describe how it can terminate or withdraw from 
them.7 Despite the lack of clear textual guidance, the generally 
 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 815 (2001); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Trump Might 
Be Stuck with NAFTA, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
yoo-ku-trump-nafta-20161129-story.html [https://perma.cc/C4GN-S565]; Joel P. Trachtman, 
Power to Terminate U.S. Trade Agreements: The Presidential Dormant Commerce Clause 
Versus an Historical Gloss Half Empty (Oct. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015981 [https://perma.cc/HE5B-VNPQ]. 
Trachtman’s claim is similar to, but potentially narrower than, Yoo’s and Ku’s. He only contends 
that presidents cannot terminate commerce-related congressional-executive agreements, and he 
takes no definitive position on the termination of other types of congressional-executive 
agreements. 
 7. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 211 
(2d ed. 1996) (“[T]he Constitution tells us only who can make treaties for the United States; it 
does not say who can unmake them.”). 
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prevailing view is that the president can act unilaterally for the United 
States in terminating treaties, at least when international law allows 
withdrawal and Congress has not prohibited it. This view is reflected in 
both the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States and in the new Restatement (Fourth).8 
This Part describes why this has become the prevailing view. It 
begins by briefly recounting the history of treaty terminations by the 
United States. Next, it discusses the principal arguments in support of 
unilateral presidential termination power. Finally, it describes the 
phenomenon of executive agreements. 
Before turning to these points, it is useful to have in mind some of 
the international law rules governing treaty termination. These rules 
are themselves set out in a treaty—the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.9 Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna 
Convention, the executive branch accepts that many provisions of the 
Convention, including its termination provisions, reflect binding 
customary international law.10 The International Court of Justice in 
The Hague has also specifically observed that the Vienna Convention 
provisions concerning termination “in many respects” reflect 
customary international law.11 
Under international law as reflected in the Vienna Convention, 
nations can suspend, terminate, or withdraw from treaties under 
various circumstances. Perhaps most obviously, they can enter into an 
agreement with the other parties to the treaty to suspend or terminate 
the treaty.12 In addition, many modern treaties contain clauses that 
allow parties to withdraw without obtaining the agreement of other 
parties, although such clauses often require a certain amount of notice 
 
 8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 339 (AM. LAW INST. 1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 113(1) (AM. LAW. INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2017) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2]. I served as a 
Reporter for the Restatement (Fourth). The views expressed in this Article are my own and do 
not necessarily reflect the position of the Restatement (Fourth). 
 9. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, pt. 3, intro. note (documenting executive 
branch statements); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2, supra note 8, § 113 reporters’ note 1 
(same). Customary international law is the law of the international community that “results from 
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 102(2). 
 11. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 46 
(Sept. 25). 
 12. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 58, 59. 
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before the withdrawal will take effect. Unsurprisingly, international 
law allows such clauses.13 Even fundamental and wide-ranging treaties 
often allow for withdrawal, as illustrated by Great Britain’s decision to 
exit the European Union, or “Brexit.” International law further allows 
a party to withdraw in response to particular developments, such as a 
material breach of the treaty by another party, or a fundamental 
change in circumstances.14 
Importantly, these international law standards all govern the 
behavior of nations and do not purport to determine which 
governmental actors within each nation can terminate an international 
agreement. Instead, that question is left for each nation to resolve 
under its domestic law.15 
A. A Brief Overview of U.S. Historical Practice 
Throughout its history, the United States has terminated treaties 
by a variety of procedures.16 The first time it did so was pursuant to a 
statute. In 1798, on the eve of war with France, Congress passed and 
President Adams signed legislation stating that the four treaties the 
United States had with France at that time “shall not henceforth be 
regarded as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of the 
United States.”17 This appears to be the only instance in U.S. history in 
which Congress purported to directly effectuate a treaty termination. 
Importantly, this action was related to Congress’s authority to declare 
war, a power that would inherently have been linked to treaty 
termination at the Founding.18 
 
 13. See id. art. 54. In a recent book, Professor Koremenos estimates that approximately 70 
percent of modern treaties contain withdrawal clauses. See BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE 
CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLAINING AGREEMENT DESIGN 140–44 (2016); see 
also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1582 (2005) (“Treaty clauses that 
authorize exit are pervasive. They are found in a wide array of multilateral and bilateral 
agreements governing key transborder regulatory issues, including human rights, trade, 
environmental protection, arms control, and intellectual property.”). 
 14. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 60 ¶ 1, 62 ¶ 1. 
 15. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (describing the international law rules governing treaty 
termination and explaining that they are distinct from the domestic rules governing such 
termination). 
 16. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 773 (2014) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Termination] (providing a history of American 
treaty termination).  
 17. Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578. 
 18. See, e.g., EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 3, ch. X, § 175 (J. Chitty ed., 
1854) (“The conventions, the treaties made with a nation, are broken or annulled by a war arising 
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During the nineteenth century, the United States did not exit from 
many treaties, but when it did so, presidents usually acted with some 
sort of legislative authorization or approval.19 Congress sometimes 
authorized presidents to terminate treaties in their discretion;20 at other 
times, Congress directed the president to terminate.21 On rare 
occasions, the Senate alone authorized presidential termination.22 
When Congress attempted to compel termination of select articles 
within treaties, however, presidents sometimes resisted on the ground 
that such action was not permissible under the treaties.23 
On other occasions in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, such as in the Lincoln and Taft administrations, presidents 
unilaterally terminated treaties and received approval after the fact 
from either Congress or the Senate.24 In another somewhat unilateral 
action, President Grant informed Congress in 1876 that he would 
 
between the contracting parties . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 339 cmt. a 
(“Congress, as distinct from the Senate alone, might perhaps claim a voice in the termination of 
a treaty where termination might create serious danger of war, in view of the authority of 
Congress to decide for war or peace under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.”); Daniel J. 
Hessel, Note, Founding-Era Jus Ad Bellum and the Domestic Law of Treaty Withdrawal, 125 
YALE L.J. 2394, 2399 (2016) (arguing that “at the Founding, treaty withdrawal provided a just 
cause of war under the law of nations” and that, “because the Constitution assigns Congress the 
power to declare war, . . . the original understanding of the Constitution contemplated a 
congressional treaty withdrawal power”). 
 19. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16, at 788–96; see also HENKIN, supra note 
7, at 211 (“At various times, the power to terminate treaties has been claimed for the President, 
for the President-and-Senate, for President-and-Congress, for Congress.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of Apr. 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109, 109–10 (authorizing President 
Polk “at his discretion” to terminate a treaty with Great Britain relating to the two countries’ joint 
occupation of the Oregon Territory).  
 21. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of Mar. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 441 (directing President Arthur to 
terminate various articles in an 1871 treaty with Great Britain, which Arthur then acted to 
terminate). 
 22. See, e.g., Franklin Pierce, Third Annual Message (Dec. 31, 1855), in 6 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2860, 2867 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) 
(explaining that President Pierce was terminating a treaty with Denmark “[i]n pursuance of the 
authority conferred by a resolution of the Senate”). 
 23. See, e.g., Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto of the Chinese Immigration Bill, H.R. Exec. Doc. 
No. 45-102, at 5 (3d Sess. 1879) (disputing that Congress can direct the abrogation of only parts 
of a treaty, while accepting that Congress can direct the termination of the entire treaty); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1920) (on file with Duke Law Journal) (declining to 
follow a congressional directive to terminate treaty obligations relating to customs duties because 
the treaties in question did not allow for such partial termination). 
 24. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of Dec. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627 (stating that President Taft’s 
notice of termination of a treaty with Russia was “adopted and ratified”); Joint Resolution of Feb. 
9, 1865, 13 Stat. 568 (“adopt[ing] and ratif[ying]” President Lincoln’s termination of a treaty with 
Great Britain). 
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suspend U.S. compliance with an extradition treaty with Great Britain 
because of that nation’s noncompliance, while noting that “[i]t is for 
the wisdom of Congress to determine whether the article of the treaty 
relating to extradition is to be any longer regarded as obligatory on the 
Government of the United States.”25 The first entirely unilateral 
presidential treaty termination may have been President McKinley’s 
1899 termination of certain clauses in a commercial treaty with 
Switzerland.26 
During the twentieth century, and especially during and after the 
administration of President Franklin Roosevelt, unilateral presidential 
termination became the norm.27 Most of these presidential treaty 
terminations have been uncontroversial. An important exception is 
President Carter’s 1978 announcement that he was withdrawing the 
United States from a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, as part of his 
recognition of the mainland Chinese government. The Taiwan defense 
treaty, which the United States approved in 1954 with senatorial advice 
and consent, provided that either party could withdraw after a year’s 
notice. In Goldwater v. Carter,28 some members of Congress brought a 
lawsuit challenging Carter’s authority to terminate the treaty. 
Although the D.C. Circuit upheld Carter’s action, the Supreme Court 
vacated the decision and ordered dismissal because it concluded that 
the case was not justiciable.29 Thus, while the courts declined to stop 
Carter’s treaty termination, Goldwater provided no definitive judicial 
resolution of the legality of unilateral presidential termination. 
The practice of unilateral presidential treaty termination has 
continued. Since Goldwater, presidents have unilaterally terminated 
dozens of treaties and, as before Goldwater, most of these terminations 
 
 25. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 20, 
1876), in 9 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4324, 4327 
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
 26. See Letter from John Hay, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Leishman (Mar. 8, 1899), 
in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 733, 753–54 (1901). 
The termination need not be viewed as purely unilateral in that McKinley was responding to a 
conflict between the treaty and a federal statute. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16, 
at 799. 
 27. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16, at 801–16. 
 28. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 29. A plurality of four justices reasoned that that the case presented a political question. See 
id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Providing a fifth vote for dismissal, Justice 
Powell reasoned that the dispute was not sufficiently ripe because “Congress has taken no official 
action,” and “[t]he Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power 
between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.” 
Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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have not generated controversy.30 One post-Goldwater termination 
that did generate controversy was President George W. Bush’s 2002 
announcement that he was withdrawing the United States from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, pursuant to a withdrawal 
clause. Thirty-two members of the House of Representatives 
challenged the withdrawal, but the case was dismissed based on lack of 
standing and the political question doctrine.31 Since that litigation, 
presidents have unilaterally terminated a number of additional 
treaties, without constitutional controversy.32 
B. Arguments in Favor of Presidential Termination Authority 
As a logical matter, the process constitutionally specified for 
making treaties could reasonably be thought to be the default process 
for unmaking them. If so, treaty termination would require the advice 
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. As the D.C. Circuit explained 
in Goldwater, however, the constitutional analysis is more complicated 
than that, for several reasons.33 
First, when resolving separation of powers issues, courts often give 
significant weight to longstanding governmental practice.34 As 
discussed in Section A, since the early twentieth century, the vast 
majority of U.S. treaty terminations have been accomplished by 
unilateral presidential action. These terminations have encompassed a 
broad range of treaties, from defense, to tax, to commerce. Moreover, 
 
 30. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16, at 814–15. 
 31. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Beacon Prods. Corp. 
v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198–99 (D. Mass. 1986) (relying on the political question doctrine 
in dismissing a challenge to President Reagan’s termination of a treaty of “Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation” with Nicaragua). 
 32. The Bush administration unilaterally terminated a protocol to a multilateral consular 
convention in 2005 and a tax treaty with Sweden in 2007. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra 
note 16, at 815. In 2016, the Obama administration unilaterally initiated withdrawal from a 
multilateral fisheries treaty, but rescinded the notice of withdrawal after the treaty was 
renegotiated. See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2016, at 149–50 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2016), https://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/272128.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XN5-9TMB]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. 
of State, Conclusion of the South Pacific Tuna Treaty Amendment Negotiations (Dec. 3, 2016), 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/264807.htm [https://perma.cc/K6DY-AZRW]. 
 33. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated on other 
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (explaining the rationales underlying the D.C. Circuit’s decision). 
 34. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 
2550, 2559 (2014). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and 
the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (discussing the role of historical practice 
in constitutional interpretation relating to the separation of powers).  
BRADLEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2018 10:30 PM 
2018] CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 1623 
with a couple of exceptions—most notably President Carter’s 
termination of the Taiwan treaty at issue in Goldwater—these 
presidential terminations have not generated controversy in Congress, 
let alone any effort by Congress to restrict presidential termination. 
Meanwhile, the Senate knows that presidents claim authority to invoke 
withdrawal clauses unilaterally, and yet it routinely consents to treaties 
containing such clauses without ever attempting to restrict presidential 
action under them. 
Second, there are structural reasons to question whether the 
constitutional process for initiating governmental action must always 
be followed for terminating governmental action. To be sure, this 
regime applies to federal statutes. To terminate a federal statute, 
governmental actors must follow the same process specified in the 
Constitution for making a statute.35 But treaties are constitutionally 
different from statutes in a number of respects. Perhaps most 
significantly for present purposes, the United States can never 
conclude a treaty without presidential agreement. Whereas Congress 
can enact statutes over a presidential veto, it is well accepted that 
Congress cannot cause the United States to join a treaty unless the 
president agrees.36 Given that a treaty cannot be made without 
presidential approval, arguably no treaty can stay in place without 
presidential approval. Moreover, even though the president needs 
senatorial consent to appoint federal officials, it is well accepted that 
presidents can generally terminate such appointments unilaterally—
again confirming that initiation and termination can have different 
processes.37 
Third, certain well-accepted presidential powers in the diplomacy 
and foreign relations areas inherently seem to carry with them some 
treaty termination authority.38 For example, the Supreme Court has 
 
 35. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
954 (1983). 
 36. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (noting that “the Senate may not conclude or 
ratify a treaty without Presidential action”); HENKIN, supra note 7, at 37 (“The President need 
not make a treaty, even if the Senate, or Congress, demands it.”); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential 
Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 209 (2009) (“[E]ven if 
Congress fully supports an international agreement, that agreement cannot be made unless and 
until the President communicates the country’s assent. Congress cannot force an unwilling 
President to consent to an agreement.”). 
 37. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Goldwater, “[e]xpansion of the language of the Constitution 
by sequential linguistic projection is a tricky business at best.” 617 F.2d at 704. 
 38. Some commentators also maintain that the first sentence of Article II of the 
Constitution—that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President”—implicitly conveys 
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made clear that the president can determine which governments and 
states the United States will recognize as legitimate, and indeed that 
Congress cannot restrict this power.39 But the power to de-recognize 
can sometimes amount to a power to suspend or terminate a treaty 
obligation with a particular state; for example, when there has been a 
change in the nature of the state entity, and thus a change in the nature 
of the treaty obligation.40 In addition, as discussed below, presidents 
can conclude executive agreements relating to matters within their 
independent constitutional authority, and the exercise of that 
noncontroversial power could in some instances suspend or terminate 
earlier treaty commitments, including most obviously by unilaterally 
making an agreement with the treaty partner to do so. 
Fourth, there are originalist and functionalist reasons to resist the 
conclusion that the process for making treaties must necessarily be 
followed for their unmaking. The Founders created a cumbersome 
process for making treaties—perhaps too cumbersome—in part 
because they were worried about excessive foreign entanglements. 
This concern does not necessarily imply that they sought to make it 
equally cumbersome to get out of such entanglements. Indeed, U.S. 
interests might be best served by having unilateral presidential 
termination authority. For example, one accepted ground for 
terminating a treaty is a material breach by the other treaty party. The 
president may be in the best position to identify and react to such 
breaches, both in terms of threatening a responsive U.S. action and 
acting quickly if such a response becomes necessary. This leverage 
would be substantially weaker if presidents needed legislative 
consent.41 
Finally, as a practical matter, treaty terminations become effective 
on the international plane with or without domestic legal symmetry 
between making and unmaking treaties. Under the Vienna 
Convention, the head of state is presumed to be a sufficient national 
 
certain powers to the president, including potentially the power to terminate treaties. See, e.g., 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 
YALE L.J. 231 (2001). For skepticism about this interpretation of the clause, see Curtis A. Bradley 
& Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 
(2004). 
 39. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2094 (“[T]he power to recognize or decline to recognize a 
foreign state and its territorial bounds resides in the President alone.”). 
 40. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 425–39 (2d 
ed. 1916).  
 41. Cf. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 706 (“In many of these situations the President must take 
immediate action.”). 
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representative for purposes of treaty termination and withdrawal.42 
Because the president is the head of state for the United States, a 
unilateral presidential notice of withdrawal will be effective under 
international law, especially given the lack of any manifest U.S. 
constitutional prohibition of such presidential action.43 This practical 
point may cause courts to be especially reluctant to second-guess 
presidential terminations.44 
In sum, it is generally accepted—although not entirely settled—
that the president has the unilateral authority to act for the United 
States in withdrawing the country from a treaty. This authority stems 
in part from the president’s power over diplomacy and role as head of 
state, as well as from longstanding historical practice. 
C. Executive Agreements 
The above Section focused on Article II treaties; that is, treaties 
made by presidents with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate. Starting early in U.S. history, presidents have concluded some 
executive agreements without the senatorial advice and consent 
process specified in Article II. For example, for many years presidents 
concluded postal agreements with other nations based on 
congressional authorization conferred by a 1792 statute.45 To take 
another early example, during the War of 1812, President Madison 
concluded an agreement with Great Britain concerning the treatment 
of prisoners of war without legislative authorization or approval.46 
Today, there are several accepted categories of executive 
agreements: congressional-executive agreements, based on ex ante 
authorization or ex post approval by a majority of Congress; treaty-
 
 42. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 67.  
 43. When a nation enters into a treaty in a manner inconsistent with its fundamental law, the 
nation is allowed to challenge the validity of the treaty if the inconsistency would have been 
“manifest” to the other treaty parties. See id. art. 46. There is no equivalent rule in the Vienna 
Convention for the unmaking of treaties. Even if there were, any U.S. law requiring legislative 
approval would not be manifest at this point. 
 44. Cf. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RES. SERV., THE NORTH 
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 26 (2017) (“As a practical matter, it appears 
that the President has the ability to terminate U.S. international commitments under international 
agreements, including trade agreements, in accordance with the agreements’ terms and the rules 
for withdrawal from treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”). 
 45. See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239. 
 46. See Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, Gr. Brit.-U.S., May 12, 1813, reprinted 
in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 557 
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931). 
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based executive agreements, made by presidents pursuant to authority 
delegated in a Senate-approved Article II treaty; and sole executive 
agreements, made by the president without congressional involvement, 
based on the president’s independent constitutional authority.47 Since 
the 1930s, executive agreements, especially congressional-executive 
agreements, have come to represent the vast majority of international 
agreements made by the United States. Indeed, they now represent 
well over 90 percent of all of the United States’ international 
agreements.48 
Most congressional-executive agreements have been ex ante—
Congress has merely delegated to presidents the authority to conclude 
agreements about a certain subject, and presidents have done so 
without returning to Congress for approval, sometimes long after the 
statute is enacted.49 Many military assistance agreements are concluded 
based on such ex ante authorization.50 Modern free trade agreements, 
however, have typically been concluded ex post—Congress has voted 
whether to approve them after they have been negotiated. This was 
true of the NAFTA agreement. Because the Constitution does not 
specifically mention the various forms of executive agreements, it of 
course does not describe how the United States can exit from them. It 
is generally assumed that presidents can unilaterally exit from sole 
executive agreements.51 It also stands to reason that presidents can 
modify treaty-based executive agreements: if the president can choose 
the method of carrying out treaty authority in the first instance, the 
president should be able to change that method within the scope of that 
authority. 
What about congressional-executive agreements? These 
 
 47. See CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 77 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter 
CRS Study]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 303. 
 48. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1212–13 (2018) (documenting how executive agreements now represent 
approximately 94 percent of international agreements made by the United States). 
 49. See Hathaway, supra note 36, at 145. 
 50. See id. at 157. 
 51. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44761. WITHDRAWAL 
FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND 
THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 6 (2017) (“Based on past practices, it appears to be generally 
accepted that, when the President has independent authority to enter into an executive 
agreement, the President may also independently terminate the agreement without congressional 
or senatorial approval.”). 
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agreements are fully “treaties” as a matter of international law.52 They 
also frequently contain withdrawal clauses just like those found in 
many modern Article II treaties. Presidential use of congressional-
executive agreements in lieu of Article II treaties is generally assumed 
to be constitutionally permissible. It is not clear whether they are fully 
interchangeable with Article II treaties under U.S domestic law. A 
number of commentators, and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law, argue that they are,53 while others suggest modest limits 
based, for example, on historical practice.54 But everyone seems to 
agree that Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements 
are roughly equivalent in legal status to federal statutes, and thus are 
subject to the later-in-time rule; that is, if a treaty or congressional-
executive agreement conflicts with a federal statute, whichever came 
about later in time controls.55 
II.  PRESIDENTIAL TERMINATION OF CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 
AGREEMENTS 
Some commentators who accept unilateral presidential power to 
terminate Article II treaties contend that this power does not extend 
to congressional-executive agreements. They make three principal 
arguments: first, that congressional-executive agreements—especially 
in the area of international trade—are based on “exclusive” 
congressional powers, which means that Congress must be involved in 
their termination;56 second, that terminating a congressional-executive 
 
 52. Under international law, a treaty includes any “international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law.” Vienna Convention, supra 
note 9, art. 2(1)(a). 
 53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 303 cmt. e; HENKIN, supra note 7, at 
217; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 806 
(1995) (naming scholars who have argued in favor of full interchangeability); cf. Oona A. 
Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United 
States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1270 (2008) (concluding that congressional-executive agreements are 
almost always interchangeable with Article II treaties). 
 54. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 961, 993–1003 (2001); John C. Yoo, supra note 6, at 852.  
 55. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 109 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 1]. 
 56. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 6 (“[T]rade deals are different, because under the 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, only Congress may alter our tariff, tax and customs laws.”); 
Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10) (“If the President is not to directly and importantly 
‘regulate’ commerce, in usurpation of Congress’ exclusive power, then the presidential power to 
send the notice of termination cannot be exercised independently of congressional 
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agreement is tantamount to terminating a statute, which the president 
cannot do unilaterally;57 and, third, that unlike the termination of 
Article II treaties, there is little historical practice supporting unilateral 
presidential termination of congressional-executive agreements. 
Before evaluating these commentators’ arguments, it is worth 
noting that the overall claim they are making is counterintuitive. 
Consider NAFTA, for example. Although it is a congressional-
executive agreement, it is fully a “treaty” on the international plane. 
Moreover, almost everyone assumes that NAFTA could have been 
concluded as an Article II treaty.58 Article 2205 of NAFTA permits a 
party to withdraw from the agreement “six months after it provides 
written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties.”59 If NAFTA had 
been concluded as an Article II treaty, the commentators I am 
disagreeing with would apparently accept that the president could 
invoke the withdrawal clause unilaterally. They contend, however, that 
because NAFTA was concluded with majority congressional approval, 
the president lacks unilateral termination authority. This argument is 
puzzling, because one might assume that, if anything, presidential 
termination authority should be lower for Article II treaties than for 
congressional-executive agreements. Article II treaties are the most 
formal means of concluding international agreements and involve what 
is in practice the most difficult procedure, and there has been 
controversy over unilateral presidential authority to terminate them. 
But, as the Congressional Research Service noted in its comprehensive 
2001 study of treaties, presidential authority to terminate non–Article 
 
authorization.”); see also Tim Meyer, Trump’s Threat to Withdraw from NAFTA May Hit a 
Hurdle: The US Constitution, CONVERSATION (Aug. 15, 2017), http://theconversation.com/ 
trumps-threat-to-withdraw-from-nafta-may-hit-a-hurdle-the-us-constitution-81444 
[https://perma.cc/4RTE-3VHT] (“The Constitution plainly assigns power over the policy areas 
covered by trade agreements—foreign trade and tariffs (taxes levied on imported goods)—to 
Congress, not the president.”). 
 57. See Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10–11) (“[B]y independently terminating a 
trade agreement, the President would be independently repealing, if not a statute per se, a treaty 
transposed into domestic law by statute. Thus, if the President acts independently to terminate a 
trade agreement, his action might be understood as partially repealing a statute.”); Yoo, supra 
note 6, at 815 (“This . . . would provide the President with the heretofore unknown power of 
executive termination of statutes.”). 
 58. Indeed, some commentators and litigants argued that it had to be concluded that way, 
although the argument did not prevail in court. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 
F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1313–17 (N.D. Ala. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 59. North American Free Trade Agreement art.2205, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 
Stat. 2057 (1993). 
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II agreements “has not been seriously challenged.”60 
A. “Exclusive” Congressional Authority? 
The first argument for distinguishing between congressional-
executive agreements and Article II treaties with respect to 
presidential termination authority is that congressional-executive 
agreements, at least in subject areas like trade, are based on 
“exclusive” congressional authority.61 In particular, the argument has 
been made that only Congress can regulate commerce, and when 
Congress does so in a congressional-executive agreement, the 
president lacks authority to terminate what Congress has done. 
For a number of reasons, this is not a strong argument. It is true 
that Congress has extensive authority to regulate commerce, and it has 
invoked its foreign commerce authority to justify the constitutionality 
of some congressional-executive agreements.62 But the suggestion that 
the commerce authority is exclusive in a way that would distinguish 
congressional-executive agreements from Article II treaties is 
unpersuasive. 
As an initial matter, characterizing the commerce power as 
exclusive is odd, in that the domestic aspects of this power are not even 
exclusive from a federalism standpoint because states have concurrent 
authority to regulate commerce.63 Of course, the claim here is that the 
commerce power is exclusive from a horizontal, separation of powers 
standpoint. But that is not true either. There may be some powers that 
only Congress can exercise at the horizontal level, and thus that cannot 
be exercised, for example, by the Senate and president when making 
treaties. The most likely example is the power to appropriate money 
from the Treasury. Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution directs that 
“[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law,”64 and it has long been assumed that this 
 
 60. CRS Study, supra note 47, at 199. 
 61. See infra text accompanying note 56. 
 62. See, e.g., Made in the USA, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1317 (endorsing the argument that “the 
Commerce Clause, coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause and the President’s foreign 
relations powers, provides sufficient authority for the completion of NAFTA”). 
 63. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the [state] statute 
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
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means that only Congress can make appropriations.65 It is possible, 
although less certain, that the power to impose taxes and tariffs is also 
an exclusive power given the mandate in Article I, Section 7 that “[a]ll 
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives . . . .”66 Even for such exclusive congressional powers, 
it has long been settled that treaties can address these matters as long 
as the treaties are non-self-executing and thus require implementing 
legislation in order to have domestic effect.67 
Importantly, however, the commerce power has never been 
considered one of these exclusive powers. As a result, there is no 
question that the Senate and president can make treaties regulating 
commerce, and that these treaties can be self-executing.68 Indeed, not 
only have Article II treaties regulating international commerce been 
common, they were the only way in which the United States concluded 
commercial agreements until the late nineteenth century. And 
presidents have acted unilaterally in terminating commerce-related 
Article II treaties. To take just a couple of examples, President 
Franklin Roosevelt terminated a commercial treaty with Italy in 1936, 
and President Reagan terminated a “friendship, commerce, and 
navigation” treaty with Nicaragua in 1985. 
The D.C. Circuit usefully explained the relationship between 
Congress’s powers and the Article II treaty power in Edwards v. 
Carter.69 The issue in that case was whether the president could convey 
the Panama Canal Zone back to Panama by means of a treaty instead 
of a statute. Those challenging President Carter’s action contended 
 
 65. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[T]he expenditure of 
funds by the United States cannot be accomplished by self-executing treaty; implementing 
legislation appropriating such funds is indispensable.”); Turner v. Am. Baptist Missionary Union, 
24 F. Cas. 344, 345 (C.C.D. Mich. 1852) (“[M]oney cannot be appropriated by the treaty-making 
power.”). 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2, supra note 8, § 110, reporters’ note 11. 
 68. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 7, at 195 (“Treaties have dealt with many matters that were 
also subject to legislation, e.g., tariffs and other regulations of commerce with foreign nations 
. . . .”). Professor John Yoo’s argument against a presidential power to terminate congressional-
executive agreements connects to his narrow originalist conception of the Article II treaty power, 
pursuant to which treaties could never be self-executing for matters falling within Congress’s 
Article I powers. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, 
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999). This conception is at odds with 
the understandings and practices that have prevailed since the Founding. See Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2191 (1999) (noting that Yoo’s argument 
“has been decisively rejected by history and tradition”). 
 69. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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that the assignment of power to Congress in Article IV, Section 3 of 
the Constitution to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States” was “exclusive” and thus could not be exercised by 
the president and Senate. The D.C. Circuit disagreed: 
The grant of authority to Congress under the property clause states 
that “The Congress shall have Power . . . ,” not that only the Congress 
shall have power, or that the Congress shall have exclusive power. In 
this respect the property clause is parallel to Article I, § 8, which also 
states that “The Congress shall have Power . . . .” Many of the powers 
thereafter enumerated in § 8 involve matters that were at the time the 
Constitution was adopted, and that are at the present time, also 
commonly the subject of treaties. The most prominent example of this 
is the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, 
and appellants do not go so far as to contend that the treaty process 
is not a constitutionally allowable means for regulating foreign 
commerce.70 
As the court noted, no one thought to contend that the commerce 
power was exclusive. 
To be sure, there is one sense in which the commerce power is 
exclusive at the horizontal level, but it is only in the same sense in which 
most of Congress’s powers are exclusive—the president lacks the 
unilateral authority to regulate the subject.71 The president cannot 
unilaterally regulate commerce, just as the president cannot 
unilaterally regulate intellectual property, or the environment, or civil 
rights. This is not because there is anything special about the commerce 
power; rather, it is simply because the president lacks legislative 
authority.72 
The only relevant implication of this exclusivity for the present 
discussion is that presidents presumably cannot conclude sole 
executive agreements regulating commerce—or intellectual property, 
the environment, civil rights, and many other matters. Rather, it is 
generally thought that presidents can conclude sole executive 
agreements only if the agreements relate to their independent Article 
 
 70. Id. at 1057–58. 
 71. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994) (“The 
Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to ‘regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations.’” (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3)). 
 72. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–27 (2008) (“[T]he President’s power to see 
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” (quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952))).  
BRADLEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2018 10:30 PM 
1632  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1615 
II powers, such as the commander-in-chief power or the recognition 
power, as informed by longstanding practice. But this limitation on the 
president’s sole executive agreement authority does not yield any 
particular reason to question presidential authority to terminate 
congressional-executive agreements, including trade agreements. Just 
as presidents lack unilateral authority to regulate commerce and other 
subjects through sole executive agreements, they also lack the 
unilateral authority to conclude Article II treaties. And yet most 
commentators assume that they can terminate such treaties. In other 
words, a lack of unilateral presidential authority to conclude such 
agreements is not thought to imply a lack of unilateral presidential 
authority to terminate them.73 
It is true that congressional-executive agreements inherently have 
something that Article II treaties do not—an enactment passed by a 
majority of both houses of Congress. As a result, unlike treaties, these 
agreements can be self-executing even with respect to issues falling 
within Congress’s exclusive authority, such as appropriations. But 
there is no inherent logical connection between the president’s 
authority to terminate an agreement and an agreement’s need for 
legislation to carry out its terms. If one accepts that presidents may 
terminate both self-executing and non-self-executing Article II 
treaties, the mere fact that congressional-executive agreements might 
have more ability to be self-executing in certain circumstances does not 
explain why termination authority should be any different. 
B. Are Congressional-Executive Agreements the Same as Statutes? 
Another argument made against a unilateral presidential power to 
terminate congressional-executive agreements is that, unlike Article II 
treaties, congressional-executive agreements are statutes, and, as the 
Supreme Court has held, the president cannot constitutionally 
terminate statutes.74 In fact, however, even though congressional-
executive agreements are connected to statutes, they are not statutes. 
Congressional-executive agreements, like Article II treaties, bind 
the United States to international commitments. In doing so, 
congressional-executive agreements accomplish something that 
 
 73. Given the breadth of Congress’s foreign commerce power, it would also likely be difficult 
in practice to draw a line between commerce-related congressional-executive agreements and 
other congressional-executive agreements. 
 74. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).  
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Congress alone lacks the power to accomplish.75 These agreements 
therefore reflect a combination of congressional and presidential 
authority.76 Congress’s role in congressional-executive agreements 
resembles the Senate’s role in Article II treaties: its approval may be 
needed, but it lacks the unilateral authority to conclude, or even to 
compel the president to conclude, an international agreement. As a 
result, the proposition that “presidents cannot terminate statutes” does 
not translate into “presidents cannot terminate congressional-
executive agreements.” 
Some commentators have suggested that, when concluding 
congressional-executive agreements, the president merely exercises 
authority delegated from Congress, and that as a result the president 
lacks termination authority unless such authority has also been 
delegated. Putting aside the fact that the conclusion does not follow 
from the premise,77 the premise is incorrect. A president concluding an 
agreement does not merely exercise delegated congressional authority. 
Congress has no authority to make binding international agreements 
in the first place and thus cannot delegate that authority to the 
president. Instead, Congress adds its commerce authority to the 
president’s agreement-making authority. This is an important addition, 
because without it the president could only conclude agreements under 
his own constitutional authority, which, as discussed above, would not 
include the ability to regulate commerce. But the same is true with 
respect to Article II treaties regulating commerce—the president 
 
 75. Professor Laurence Tribe worries that the constitutional reasoning supporting such 
agreements might allow Congress to conclude international agreements even over a presidential 
veto, which he noted would constitute a “radical change . . . [in] the foreign policy architecture of 
our constitutional system.” Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections 
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1255 (1995). But 
proponents of congressional-executive agreements have not made such a claim. See, e.g., David 
M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1893–94 (1998) (accepting 
that “Congress may approve agreements but for historical reasons it is enjoined from acting 
independently in the realm of foreign negotiations” while noting that this proposition is consistent 
with constitutional arguments supporting congressional-executive agreements). 
 76. See Hathaway, supra note 53, at 1336 (“The President, on the other hand, manages the 
negotiations of the agreement with the foreign government and registers the formal assent of the 
United States to the agreement (based on the authority or assent offered by Congress), thereby 
binding the country as a matter of international law.”). 
 77. See Michael Ramsey, Could President Trump Unilaterally Withdraw the U.S. from its 
International Agreements?, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Sept. 9, 2016), http://originalismblog.typepad. 
com/the-originalism-blog/2016/09/julian-ku-on-president-trump-withdrawing-from-international 
-agreementsmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/BGA8-GYJ3] (“[T]he fact that the trade 
agreements are negotiated under a congressional delegation of authority does not imply any 
limitation on the President. All trade authority delegated to the President is discretionary.”). 
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cannot conclude those on his own constitutional authority either—and 
thus this observation does not provide a reason to conclude that the 
president has less termination authority for congressional-executive 
agreements than for Article II treaties. 
It might seem like a harder case in the event of an ex post 
congressional-executive agreement, like NAFTA, where Congress 
enacts legislation approving an agreement after it has been negotiated. 
Is the president in effect terminating that legislation by withdrawing 
the United States from NAFTA? Not more so, I would suggest, than 
terminating a Senate resolution of advice and consent for an Article II 
treaty, which similarly gives consent to an already-negotiated 
agreement—a practice, again, generally assumed to be constitutional.78 
Of course, there may well be other aspects of implementing legislation 
for an ex post congressional-executive agreement that the president 
cannot terminate. But note that this would be true as well for 
legislation implementing an Article II treaty. In both situations, it may 
be that the president can terminate the agreement but is stuck with the 
implementing legislation unless and until Congress repeals it.79 That is 
an important point, but it does not itself disallow a presidential 
termination authority. 
In the trade area, Congress has actually addressed the continuing 
effect of its implementing legislation in the event of a termination of 
the underlying agreement, and it has done so in a way that seems to 
accept a presidential termination authority. The United States is a 
party to fourteen free trade agreements, covering twenty countries. For 
most of them, the implementing legislation provides (as it does, for 
example, for the trade agreement between the United States and South 
Korea) that “[o]n the date on which the Agreement ceases to be in 
 
 78. See David Golove & Marty Lederman, Do Congressional-Executive Agreements 
Establish More Reliable Commitments than Treaties?, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 21, 2008), http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2008/03/21/do-congressional-executive-agreements-establish-more-reliable-
commitments-than-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/TE4V-43QR] (“[E]ven legislation implementing a 
pact will ordinarily be dependent on the ongoing validity of the agreement under international 
law.” (emphasis in original)). 
 79. See Hathaway, supra note 53, at 1334 (“Even though the President may be able to 
‘unmake’ the international commitment created by a congressional-executive agreement as a 
matter of international law, the President cannot unmake the legislation on which the agreement 
rests.”). This is actually more complicated than Professor Hathaway suggests. For example, if 
Congress intends its implementing legislation to last only as long as the United States remains a 
party to an agreement, then the legislation may terminate of its own force after presidential 
withdrawal from the agreement. See Golove & Lederman, supra note 78. 
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force,” the legislation “shall cease to be effective.”80 Certain other 
agreements, including NAFTA, are governed by a more general 
provision in the Trade Act of 1974, which provides that, in the event of 
a termination of the agreement, U.S. duties and other import 
restrictions “shall not be affected . . . and shall remain in effect after 
the date of such termination or withdrawal for 1 year, unless the 
President by proclamation provides that such rates shall be restored to 
the level at which they would be but for the agreement.”81 
This legislation appears to assume that these agreements may be 
terminated without congressional approval. If such approval were 
required, Congress could simply address the continuing effect of its 
implementing legislation and any presidential proclamations enacted 
thereunder at that time rather than needing to address it in advance. 
Notably, in referring generally to termination of these agreements, 
Congress never says that a U.S. action to terminate the agreement 
would require congressional approval. Instead, Congress merely insists 
that there be U.S. withdrawal rights, and it addresses what happens to 
its implementing legislation in the event of withdrawal. This silence is 
especially notable given that these agreements all contain withdrawal 
clauses invocable at will by either party, and presidents have long 
asserted the authority to invoke similar clauses in Article II treaties. 
Various forms of this trade legislation date back at least to the Trade 
Act of 1930, and yet in the succeeding eighty-eight years Congress has 
never sought to limit presidential termination in this legislation. 
Some commentators have suggested that, by tying the continuing 
effect of implementing legislation to presidential termination, 
Congress is acting unconstitutionally.82 Specifically, the argument is 
that, under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Clinton v. City of New 
York,83 Congress cannot delegate to the president the authority to 
“cancel statutes.” In Clinton, the Court held unconstitutional the Line 
Item Veto Act, which allowed the president to cancel certain 
provisions in appropriations statutes after they were enacted.84 
Clinton is distinguishable, however, on at least four grounds. First, 
and most importantly, the Court emphasized that the Line Item Veto 
Act improperly allowed presidential cancellation of appropriations 
 
 80. 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note (2012) (Administration of Dispute Settlement Proceedings). 
 81. Id. § 2135(e). 
 82. See Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 19–22); see also Meyer, supra note 56. 
 83. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 84. See id. at 448–49. 
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measures based on conditions that existed when Congress enacted the 
measures.85 This is not true, however, if a statute’s continuing effect 
turns on whether the United States remains a party to an agreement in 
the future. When the president takes action in the future that relates to 
a condition set forth by Congress in legislation, the president does not 
cancel the legislation; rather, the president gives full effect to the 
legislation containing the condition.86 
Second and relatedly, the Line Item Veto Act allowed the 
president to take action in conflict with congressional policy as 
reflected in an appropriations statute. As the Court noted, “whenever 
the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a limited tax 
benefit he is rejecting the policy judgment made by Congress and 
relying on his own policy judgment.”87 The trade statutes discussed 
above, however, do not have this effect. Indeed, Congress’s policy is 
presumably to ensure that preferential trade measures apply only while 
the United States remains a party to a reciprocally binding agreement. 
Therefore, it would accord with congressional policy if trade 
preferences were ended when the United States withdraws from an 
agreement. 
Third, the Court in Clinton specifically noted that it was dealing 
with a domestic statute and that there is more leeway with respect to 
delegation in the area of foreign affairs, most notably trade and 
commerce.88 Fourth, the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton was novel. By 
 
 85. See id. at 443 (emphasizing that “the exercise of the cancellation power within five days 
after the enactment of the Balanced Budget and Tax Reform Acts necessarily was based on the 
same conditions that Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes”). 
 86. See BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RES. SERV., R44630, U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED LEGAL QUESTIONS 15 (2016) (“[T]he 
President’s authority to exercise the power depends on a condition that did not exist when 
Congress passed the [free trade agreement] implementing law.”). This is even easier to see for an 
ex ante congressional-executive agreement. Imagine that Congress merely stated in a statute that 
“we hereby consent in advance to the president concluding an agreement on subject X.” If the 
president proceeds to conclude an agreement on that subject, and then later terminates that 
agreement, he has done nothing to cancel the statute. 
 87. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 444. 
 88. See id. at 445. It is not uncommon for statutes, especially in the foreign affairs area—
sanctions laws, for instance—to set default legal mandates conditioned on presidential action or 
inaction. These arrangements have not been thought to be unconstitutional. For an example, see 
22 U.S.C. § 9411(a)(1) (2012) (“The President may waive . . . a requirement . . . to impose or 
maintain sanctions with respect to a person, . . . after the President determines and reports to the 
appropriate congressional committees that it is vital to the national security interests of the United 
States to waive such sanctions.”). See also Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of 
International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1548 (2004) (“Given the relative breadth of 
national authority over foreign affairs, it is probable that limits on congressional power 
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contrast, as noted below, many presidents have terminated trade 
agreements—often, but not always with the consent of the trading 
partner. These presidents and Congress have all assumed that these 
terminations ended the mandated trade preferences in the 
implementing legislation. It is unlikely that this practice, accepted by 
both political branches and both major political parties over the course 
of many administrations and congresses, would now be found to violate 
the separation of powers.89 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not always deferred to 
longstanding separation of powers arrangements. Most notably, it 
declined to do so in INS v. Chadha,90 in which it held that a “legislative 
veto” provision was unconstitutional despite decades of practice in 
which Congress had enacted such provisions. But that decision, too, is 
distinguishable. There, the legislative veto provision reserved power to 
Congress that the Court thought conflicted with clear constitutional 
text. By contrast, the trade statutes discussed above potentially 
delegate authority to the president rather than Congress, and it is 
difficult to see how that conflicts with clear constitutional text. It is also 
worth noting that in Chadha the Court observed that Congress’s 
inclusion of legislative veto provisions was not a settled practice in light 
of the fact that numerous presidents had questioned their 
constitutionality.91 There is no comparable level of ongoing 
contestation regarding the president’s authority to terminate 
international agreements. 
C. What About (Lack of) Historical Practice? 
Another potential reason to distinguish between presidential 
 
established in the domestic sphere—like nondelegation—do not apply with precisely the same 
force to treaties and congressional-executive agreements.”). 
 89. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015) (“Over the last 100 years, there has 
been scarcely any debate over the President’s power to recognize foreign states.”); NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2564 (2014) (“[T]hree-quarters of a century of settled practice is long 
enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper interpretation’ of the constitutional 
provision.” (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929))); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936) (“A legislative practice such as we have here . . . 
goes a long way in the direction of proving . . . unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the 
practice, to be found in the origin and history of the power involved, or in its nature, or in both 
combined.”). 
 90. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 91. See id. at 942 n.13 (“11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been 
presented with this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as 
unconstitutional.”). 
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authority to terminate Article II treaties and presidential authority to 
terminate congressional-executive agreements concerns historical 
practice. The president’s authority to terminate Article II treaties 
stems in part from longstanding historical practice, also known as 
“historical gloss,”92 and it may appear that such gloss does not exist 
with respect to the termination of congressional-executive 
agreements.93 The United States has not terminated many 
congressional-executive agreements, so if one looks just at that subset 
of international agreements, the practice will not seem very extensive. 
A threshold problem with this historical practice argument is that 
it is not clear why the practice of terminating congressional-executive 
agreements should be considered separately from the practice of 
terminating other types of agreements, such as Article II treaties and 
sole executive agreements. As demonstrated above, arguments about 
a purportedly exclusive commerce clause and the disallowance of 
presidential termination of statutes fail to justify a distinctive treatment 
for each practice. Without a good reason for subdividing them, the 
mere fact that terminations of congressional-executive agreements 
have been infrequent compared to Article II treaties has little 
analytical significance. 
In any event, existing practice is consistent with presidential 
authority to terminate congressional-executive agreements. A number 
of the Article II treaties terminated throughout history have concerned 
trade or commerce. Indeed, as noted above, what may have been the 
very first unilateral presidential termination concerned a trade treaty.94 
So there is practice with respect to terminating agreements relating to 
those subject areas, without any specific authorization from the 
legislative branch. In addition, in the 1950s and 1960s, presidents 
terminated multiple ex ante congressional-executive agreements 
relating to trade by obtaining the consent of the trading partner, but 
not Congress.95 More recently, in 2012 President Barack Obama 
 
 92. See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 34 (discussing the nature and role of 
historical gloss).  
 93. See Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 11–17). 
 94. See supra text accompanying note 26. For additional examples, see Bradley, Treaty 
Termination, supra note 16, at 807, 809, 814. 
 95. President Johnson did so in 1969 with respect to a trade agreement with Switzerland; 
President Kennedy did so in 1961 with respect to a trade agreement with Honduras; President 
Eisenhower did so in 1955 with respect to a trade agreement with Guatemala; and President 
Truman did so in both 1951 with respect to a trade agreement with Costa Rica, and in 1950 with 
respect to trade agreements with Finland, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sweden. 
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terminated a congressional-executive agreement relating to 
screwworm eradication by entering into an agreement with Mexico.96 
In some instances, congressional-executive trade agreements have 
been terminated even without the consent of the trading partner.97 
In addition, the United States has joined a number of international 
organizations through ex post congressional-executive agreements, 
and presidents have sometimes unilaterally withdrawn from the 
agreements. For example, the United States joined the International 
Labour Organization in 1934 through a congressional-executive 
agreement. In 1975, the Ford administration unilaterally withdrew the 
United States from the Organization, and in 1980 the Carter 
administration unilaterally had the United States rejoin.98 Similarly, 
the United States became a member of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) through 
a congressional-executive agreement, and the Reagan administration 
unilaterally withdrew the United States in 1983. After the Bush 
administration rejoined in 2003, the Trump administration once again 
announced a withdrawal.99 
Finally, Congress has not indicated that it views congressional-
executive agreements as special for purposes of presidential 
termination authority. Congress has consented to withdrawal clauses 
 
 96. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Mexican States Relating to the Termination of the 1972 Agreement 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United 
Mexican States to Eradicate Screwworms, Mex.-U.S., Sept. 24–25, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 12-925.1. 
 97. For example, in 1955 President Eisenhower terminated a trade agreement with Ecuador 
and did not claim to have obtained Ecuador’s consent. See Proclamation No. 3111 (Aug. 27, 1955), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107254 [https://perma.cc/F4KZ-65P6]. In 1982 
President Reagan terminated a trade agreement with Argentina because of a material breach. See 
Proclamation No. 4993 (Oct. 29, 1982), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41938 
[https://perma.cc/P9QN-UNRS]. 
 98. See 22 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (authorizing U.S. membership in the International Labor 
Organization and acceptance of the ILO Constitution and subsequent amendments); U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, at 70–73 
(Eleanor C. McDowell ed., 1976) (withdrawing from ILO); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF 
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1980, at 76–78 (Marian Nash Leich ed., 
1986) (rejoining ILO).  
 99. 22 U.S.C. § 287m (authorizing U.S. membership in and acceptance in UNESCO in 
accordance with its constitution); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED 
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981–1988, at 405–09 (Marian Nash (Leich) ed., 
1993) (withdrawing from UNESCO); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2003, at 421–23 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 
2004) (rejoining UNESCO); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t State, The United States Withdraws from 
UNESCO (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/10/274748.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/6WFE-NQ5N].  
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in these agreements without ever indicating that that presidents must 
return to Congress to invoke the clauses, despite a long history of 
presidents unilaterally invoking similar clauses in Article II treaties. 
Moreover, as discussed above, the legislation that Congress has 
enacted relating to congressional-executive agreements in the trade 
area appears to assume that presidents might terminate such 
agreements unilaterally. There are also examples of this sort of 
legislation outside the trade area.100 In the few modern instances in 
which Congress as a body has addressed the termination of treaties and 
congressional-executive agreements, it has been to encourage 
presidents to terminate particular agreements, not to limit their 
authority to do so. 
III.  OTHER LIMITATIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL TERMINATION 
As discussed above, if one accepts a presidential power to 
terminate Article II treaties, there is little reason to conclude that this 
power does not also apply to congressional-executive agreements. 
Even so, there are other potential constraints on withdrawal from 
international agreements.101 As an initial matter, presidents may find 
that international agreements are “sticky” for a variety of reasons. 
These reasons include the continuing effect of implementing legislation 
and administrative regulations, as well as domestic and international 
expectation interests that are generated from the agreement. 
International law also constrains presidential withdrawal from 
international agreements. The analysis above assumed that a president 
would withdraw the United States from an agreement based on 
accepted international law grounds, such as by invoking a withdrawal 
clause in a treaty and giving the requisite notice. If the United States 
does not comply with international law in attempting to withdraw from 
a treaty, then the treaty is still binding as a matter of international law. 
As a result, whether a president’s notice of treaty termination is 
effective in ending corresponding U.S. obligations is ultimately 
determined by international law, not U.S. law.102 
 
 100. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (2012) (“The provisions of this chapter relating to the 
surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only 
during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, The President’s Power to Withdraw the United States from 
International Agreements at Present and in the Future, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 445, 445–49 (2018); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century International 
Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. F. 338, 355–66 (2017). 
 102. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2, supra note 8, § 113(2). 
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Importantly, if the president cannot release the United States 
from the international law obligations in an agreement, the president 
may have no incentive to break international law rules for withdrawal. 
To take a recent example, President Trump announced shortly after 
taking office that the United States would withdraw from the Paris 
climate change agreement. But he has apparently accepted that this 
cannot be effectuated for some time, because the agreement specifies 
that a party may not initiate withdrawal until three years after the 
agreement has entered into force for that party and that such 
withdrawal would then become effective one year after that. 
To be sure, a president might want to terminate the domestic 
effects of a treaty even without the ability to terminate the 
international law effects. There are strong reasons to conclude, 
however, that presidents lack such domestic termination authority. 
Most notably, the Constitution makes treaties part of the supreme law 
of the land, and it states that presidents are to take care that the “Laws” 
are faithfully executed.103 If this reference in the Take Care Clause 
encompasses treaties, as seems likely,104 a president cannot declare that 
a treaty no longer has domestic effect and proceed to disregard it.105 
Such action would involve violating the law, not executing the law.106 
Presidential authority in this regard is different from congressional 
authority. Congress can clearly end the domestic effect of a treaty even 
while the United States remains a party to it. That is, Congress can 
place the United States in breach of treaties, pursuant to the later-in-
time doctrine mentioned at Part I. Under that doctrine, a federal 
statute enacted after a treaty controls as a matter of domestic law if the 
statute conflicts with the treaty.107 But this is because, in the U.S. 
 
 103. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 104. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1231–32 
(2005).  
 105. Non-self-executing treaties may complicate this conclusion. The Supreme Court has 
explained that a non-self-executing treaty “does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable 
federal law.” Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008). There is some uncertainty about 
whether such treaties qualify as domestic law for purposes of the Take Care Clause. See Ramsey, 
supra note 104, at 1232–33. 
 106. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 103–04 (2004) (“[A] presidential decision to breach a treaty, in 
contravention of international law, may violate the President’s duty under the Take Care Clause.” 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)). 
 107. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 1, supra note 55, § 109(2). If possible, however, 
courts construe statutes to avoid violation of a treaty. See id. § 109(1); see also Murray v. The 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never 
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”). 
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domestic legal system, both treaties and federal statutes are types of 
law—and, as the domestic lawmaker for the United States, Congress 
can alter the controlling law.108 By contrast, the president is not a 
domestic lawmaker.109 
Nevertheless, the Bush administration’s Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) suggested in a 2002 memorandum that a president could 
suspend the effect of a treaty even when suspension was not 
permissible under international law.110 The memorandum claimed that 
“[t]he President’s power to suspend treaties is wholly discretionary, 
and may be exercised whenever he determines that it is in the national 
interest to do so.”111 Shortly after President Obama took office, 
however, his OLC disavowed this and another similar memorandum 
from the Bush administration.112 The Obama OLC noted that it had 
“found the two opinions’ treatment of this history to be unpersuasive, 
their analysis equating treaty termination with treaty suspension to be 
doubtful, and their consideration of the Take Care Clause to be 
insufficient.”113 
In addition to these constraints, Congress can probably limit 
presidential termination authority if it wishes. For a congressional-
executive agreement, such a limitation could be included in the 
 
 108. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“If the treaty operates by its 
own force, and relates to a subject within the power of Congress, it can be deemed in that 
particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of 
Congress.”); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (“The Constitution gives [a treaty] no 
superiority over an act of Congress in this respect, which may be repealed or modified by an act 
of a later date.”). 
 109. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 526–27 (“[T]he President’s power to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952))). 
 110. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. & Robert J. 
Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Bellinger, III, 
Senior Assoc. Counsel to the President & Legal Adviser to the Nat’l Sec. Council, Authority of 
the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty (Nov. 15, 2001), 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty 11152001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y4Y-FWCH].  
 111. Id. at 12. 
 112. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., 
for the Files, Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001, at 8–9 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/ 
2009/03/09/ memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SEJ-JF9T] (indicating that 
the two memoranda should not be relied upon “to the extent they suggest[] that the President has 
unlimited authority to suspend a treaty beyond the circumstances traditionally recognized”). 
 113. Id. at 9. The Obama OLC also observed, however, that a 2007 memorandum it was not 
disavowing asserted that presidents have traditionally exercised unilateral power to suspend 
treaties “where suspension was authorized by the terms of the treaty or under recognized 
principles of international law.” Id.  
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legislation authorizing or approving the agreement. For Article II 
treaties, the Senate could include it in its resolution of advice and 
consent. Such limitations could require legislative assent to 
termination, or something less than that, such as advance notice to 
Congress.114 Under Justice Jackson’s canonical framework in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for analyzing presidential 
power, these limitations would be binding on the president unless they 
invaded an exclusive presidential power.115 
Absent any constitutional text specifically addressing termination 
authority, and given Congress’s involvement in most nineteenth-
century treaty terminations, it is difficult to conclude that treaty 
termination authority is an exclusive presidential power.116 Indeed, 
even in the twentieth century, Congress sometimes involved itself in 
treaty terminations. In 1986, for example, Congress enacted legislation 
over President Reagan’s veto, directing the secretary of state to 
terminate two agreements with South Africa—an Article II tax treaty 
and a congressional-executive agreement relating to air services—and 
the secretary of state did so.117 Another post–World War II example of 
congressional involvement in the termination of international 
agreements was in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. 
There, Congress directed the president “[a]s soon as practicable” to 
“take such action as is necessary to suspend, withdraw or prevent the 
application of” concessions “contained in any trade agreement entered 
into under authority of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930” relating 
 
 114. A presidential administration could attempt to limit the treaty withdrawals of future 
administrations by, for example, requiring certain internal executive branch processes prior to 
such action. See Galbraith, supra note 101, at 449. 
 115. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can 
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting 
upon the subject.”); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the 
President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military 
commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own 
war powers, placed on his powers.”). 
 116. See CRS Study, supra note 47, at 199 (“[T]he assertion of an exclusive Presidential power 
in the context of a treaty is controversial and flies in the face of a substantial number of precedents 
in which the Senate or Congress have been participants.”). There might be narrow instances in 
which a congressional restriction on the termination of a treaty would improperly interfere with 
an exclusive presidential power, such as the president’s power over recognizing foreign 
governments and territories.  
 117. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100, 
1104. 
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to imports from the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries.118 
President Truman relied on the Act in terminating a number of 
congressional-executive trade agreements.119 If termination is, as it 
appears to be, a concurrent rather than exclusive power, Congress can 
regulate it.120 
CONCLUSION 
This Article assumes for the sake of argument that presidents can 
legally withdraw the United States from Article II treaties. Substantial 
arguments support that assumption, but the Supreme Court has not 
dispositively resolved the issue. If that assumption falters, so too does 
the proposition that presidents can withdraw the United States from 
congressional-executive agreements. But if presidents do have the 
legal authority to withdraw from Article II treaties, it is not clear why 
that authority would not extend to congressional-executive 
agreements. 
This Article focuses exclusively on the proper legal analysis of 
unilateral presidential termination authority rather than on the 
underlying policy issues associated with the exercise of such authority. 
The Article does not endorse presidential withdrawal from any 
particular international agreements. Nor does it suggest that 
unfettered presidential withdrawal authority is always desirable. It 
might be better for the stability of U.S. foreign relations if presidential 
withdrawal authority were subject to greater constraints, at least for 
certain types of agreements. Any such constraints, however, likely will 
 
 118. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, § 5, 65 Stat. 72, 73.  
 119. See OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1951, EUROPE: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, VOLUME IV, 
PART 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v04p2/d169 [https://perma.cc/2JCX 
-RMPV]. 
 120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 339 n.3 (“[A]s a condition applicable to the 
treaty before it and having a plausible relation to its adoption, such a condition [on termination] 
would presumably be valid . . . , and if the President proceeded to make the treaty he would be 
bound by the condition.”); CRS Study, supra note 47, at 208 (“To the extent that the agreement 
in question is authorized by statute or treaty, its mode of termination likely could be regulated by 
appropriate language in the authorizing statute or treaty.”); see also, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, 
Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 279–86 (2013) (arguing 
that “for cause” limitations imposed by the Senate on the President’s treaty-termination power 
would be constitutional). Professor Hathaway argues that, as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, “the case for congressional control over withdrawal from congressional-executive 
agreements is much stronger than the case for congressional control over withdrawal from 
treaties.” Hathaway, supra note 53, at 1323. I doubt this, but I nevertheless agree that Congress 
could regulate termination of such agreements.  
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need to come from either the Senate, when approving Article II 
treaties, or from the full Congress. 
